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REMARKS
THE EMERGING LAW OF THE INTERNET
Arthur R. Miller*
It's a pleasure and an honor to be with you today. A pleasure
because this is my first time on your beautiful campus. An honor
because this is a distinguished lecture series, and I was motivated
to accept the kind invitation to talk today because it came from my
friend Ron Ellington' and because my dearly beloved senior
coauthor, the late Charles Alan Wright, had delivered this lecture
many, many years ago. So, I feel as if there is something
genealogical about my being here.
Now, you would think that I would talk to you about Civil
Procedure. After all, that is my professional world and it's always
been my professional world, and I'm arrogant enough to believe I
know something about it. But, after all the years I've spent in
Procedure, speaking about it again is frankly uninviting for me and
probably would be quite boring for you. So, I thought I would talk
to you about something I know nothing about, but strikes me as
challenging and basic to your future. It's far more fun, especially
since these remarks will be very impressionistic and possibly a bit
irreverent.
I'm going to talk to you about the Internet, the Internet as it
relates to our profession. You all know what the Internet is. You all
are on the Internet at one point or another; many of you, perhaps,
for too much of your day; some of you, perhaps, for not enough of
your day. This is not intended to be an exercise in prediction;
* Bruce Bromley Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. This address was given at the
University of Georgia School of Law on November 14, 2002 as part of the John A. Sibley
Lecture Series. These Remarks remain faithful to the unscripted remarks given on the date of the Lecture.
Footnote references have been kept to a minimum.
' C. Ronald Ellington, A. Gus Cleveland Professor of Legal Ethics and Professionalism
and former Dean, University of Georgia School of Law.
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Nostradamus I am not. Nor am I going to make forecasts or take
bets because Jimmy the Greek I am not. This will be something of
a still picture of where I believe we are in thinking in legal terms
about the Internet, and, I suppose, I will be proven a liar because I
will probably offer a suggestive thought about the future here or
there.
The Internet is interesting because it is another example of the
law having to deal with a social phenomenon. In this case, it
happens to be a technological phenomenon. This is not a new
exercise for the Bench and Bar. The law is not a stranger to
technology or having to deal with technology. I suppose it started
with fire, which is its own form of technology, especially once
humans began to harness it. It graduated to the wheel. After the
wheel, perhaps the steam engine, the internal combustion engine,
the automobile, the airplane, the telephone, radio, television, the fax
machine, the computer, and now the Internet. So, we are not a
stranger to this phenomenon. It's recurrent. One thing we do know,
simply on the basis of experience over time, is that the law tends to
be reactive to societal change. It tends to look at a new
phenomenon, in this context the new technology and, over time,
figure out what to do with it. It generally moves slowly and
cautiously-a step at a time.
When railroads came along, everybody applauded. They tied the
country together. But they also, because of the technology of its
time, caused fires to adjacent land. And that raised these wonderful
questions of-How do we maximize the utility of the technology and
minimize the deleterious side effects? How do we accommodate the
rights of the railroad with those of the farmer? It took close to 100
years to figure that one out-always reactive, always trying to see
what the state of the art was at a moment in time, what was
technologically feasible, what the risk/benefit analysis was.
So, perhaps we're not so stupid being reactive-watching,
waiting, building experience. Indeed, in those instances in which
the law has not been reactive but has tried to be ahead of the curve
as they say, prematurity has been the result. I spent a great deal
of time working in connection with what became the Copyright Act
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of 1973/6.2 We thought we were ever so clever. Unfortunately,
because of rapid technological change, the statute was obsolete on
the day it was enacted. Then I was appointed to a Presidential
Commission to study the computer and copyright, and, once again,
we thought we were ever so clever.3 We had figured out what to do
with things like computer programs and data banks and artificial
intelligence. And, we put our report into Congress, and Congress
duly enacted what we proposed.' Then along came the chip, and it
made everything we had done obsolete. So, sometimes it's better to
be the turtle rather than the hare. We will have to see whether or
not our reaction to the Internet misses the mark on one side or the
other or whether we hit it on target.
Before going further I must make a disclaimer. Please do not
think that I'm a technologist, because I am not. I started college
studying to be a metallurgical engineer. It lasted eight days-in one
early morning Algebra class, I fell asleep, I fell out of my chair, got
up, walked out, and changed my major. To this day, I cannot spell
metallurgy. But I do have an instinct that I am not far from the
mark by believing that the Internet and the allied technology that
makes up the Internet is potentially the most powerful medium of
communication the world has ever known, and it is only likely to
increase in stature. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court,
which generally is not technologically advanced, has already
remarked that the Internet is a wholly new medium of worldwide
human communication'-and that's what it is. It's a worldwide
medium of human communication. Think about this simple fact.
We can move any piece of information, with picture or without,
anywhere on the planet in under two seconds-any amount of
information with or without pictures anywhere on the planet in
under two seconds. That's astounding. Yet today we take it for
granted.
Another thing. Digital communication is infinitely replicable.
You can make as many copies of anything on the Internet as you
2 17 U.S.C. §§ 100 et seq. (2004).
3 National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final Report
on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (1979).
17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 403 (2004).
See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997).
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want. In doing so, you do not have to worry about degradability.
The 452,000th copy, qualitatively, is just as good as the first. No
other communications medium can make any of those statements.
We even have given the world of the Internet a name. We call it
cyberspace-and what is cyberspace?
I can't see it. I can't feel it. All I know is that I'm in it, and we're
all in it. It surrounds each and every one of us. And when you
think about cyberspace, you can think of it as an alternative
universe. It's like something out of "Star Trek." We're going
through some sort of a warp, maybe not a time warp, but we're
going to an alternative universe that has a virtual reality, to use the
cich6. And, most strikingly of all, it is basically a legally free-fire
zone.
No formal law controls cyberspace. At the moment, there is a
degree of self-regulation, but total reliance on that can't last over
time. The number of chips on the table, the social implications, the
economic stakes, the political implications of cyberspace are too
stunning to leave to private regulation over time. And that's where
we come in, because in one way or another, particularly you
folks-most of whom look younger than I-will be the regulators of
cyberspace. You will have to figure it out. And, I submit to you that
just as cyberspace is an alternative universe, over time it will reflect
the entire universe of the law. Virtually anything you can think
about in terms of law will in some way or another emerge and pose
a problem in cyberspace. These problems will challenge the
transaction lawyers, the litigators, the Bench, and the scholars.
The mega-question I suppose is-Will there be a law of
cyberspace; will it be something brand new? Will your Professor
Dick Wellman6 (who was my colleague at the University of Michigan
Law School four decades ago) spend the remaining years of his
marvelous career as a law teacher and a commissioner on uniform
state law developing a uniform law of cyberspace? I hope so. He
has more talent to do something like that than anyone I know. Or,
will this be, as so much of the law is-again as the clich6 goes-new
6 Richard V. Well-an, Robert Cotten Alston Chair in Corporate Law Emeritus,
University of Georgia School of Law.
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wine in old bottles? Will we take existing doctrines and simply
recast them or moderate or modulate them and say, "This cyberspa-
ce stuff.. . there's nothing new here, nothing new at all. We just
have to tweak the tried and true." Well, I'd like you to consider
three examples of law in cyberspace and think about them in terms
of "where do we go from here." Think about them in terms of what
I just said is the mega-question-new or old?7
Now at the risk of being stoned to death for my first example,
because I said I was not going to talk about Procedure. I would like
to take a subject that my good friend Ron is a master at-jurisdicti-
on over the person. He tells me that he taught that subject this fall
to his class, so I assume that those of you who are first year
students are extremely well-versed in jurisdiction over the person.
What principles apply to the Internet? Think about Web sites.
Each and every one of us can sit down and access any Web site
around the world. Does that mean that the operator of that Web
site is subject to personal jurisdiction everywhere? That might
suggest that Ron needs to be put out to pasture because there is
nothing left to teach in civil procedure. We'll have universal
jurisdiction-that will make everything very simple.
Well, it can't be that simple. No matter what the power of
cyberspace might be, it has to deal with certain doctrines like state
sovereignty, national sovereignty, various aspects of due process,
such as fairness, notice, and opportunity to be heard. So, what are
we going to do to figure out how or when you get or don't get
jurisdiction based on the accessibility-here in Athens, Georgia, or
up in Cambridge, Massachusetts--of a Web site? Indeed, where is
that Web site? Where is it?-Where the person who designed it is?
Where the software is? Where the server is? Where the
communications link you fortuitously tap into when you access the
Web site is? Where is it? Let's put that question to one side. That
is very hard to figure out.
You know, in spite of the fact that there are many predecessors
of the Internet in terms of communications technology, just think
Different views on this subject can be found in Lawrence Lessig, CODE AND OTHER
LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Hor8e,
1996 U. CHI. LGAL. F. 207.
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about them-the postal system, wire and then wireless telegraphy,
the airwaves, telephone, and fax-in just a few years, there are
more cases that have been decided about Internet jurisdiction than
have been decided regarding all of those technologies put together,
even though some of them have been around for more than 100
years. Now, what do the Internet authorities say? It's not
definitively clear yet. No case has reached the Supreme Court, but
there are footprints in the sand. A very, very forward thinking
federal District Judge in Pennsylvania five years ago, in Zippo
Manufacturing Company v. Zippo.com, Inc.,8 came up with the
notion that you could array Web sites on a spectrum and think
about jurisdiction based on a particular Web site by looking at its
position on the spectrum. He says at one end of the spectrum are
what are called passive Web sites; they speak to you. You can reach
into the Web site, and it will give you information-it's just passive,
and therefore there is no jurisdiction. The Web site didn't come to
you. You came to the Web site. Sitting in Athens, you reached to
Palo Alto. And, you know there is a rough analogy-the great case
of Worldwide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson.9  Do you
remember, the Robinsons bought the car in Northern New York and
were driving it to Arizona when an accident caused it to burn up in
Oklahoma. Volkswagen didn't put the car in Oklahoma. So, the
Zippo Judge concluded, "Look, passive Web sites can't provide a
jurisdictional base. If you took jurisdiction based on the passive
Web site, there would be universal jurisdiction." And, I'd say that
idea is established. 10
At the other end of the Web site spectrum is the active Web
site... the active Web site. What's an active Web site? The one on
which you can literally not only exchange conversation with the Web
site, but you can transact business through the Web site. I happen
to love fountain pens. Having nothing to do on Sunday and, since
I lead an exceedingly boring life, I went on the computer. I
discovered that in Melbourne, Australia, there was a pen I was
8 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1125-26 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (McLaughlin, J.).
0 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
10 See generally 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 1073 (3d ed. 2002) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER).
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looking for. And, with the "backing" and "forthing" between the
seller and myself and the appropriate bargaining that befits my
ethnicity, I bought the pen. Now, I think there's jurisdiction there
under fairly traditional principles. I think this poor seller in
Melbourne is subject to jurisdiction in Cambridge, Massachusetts,
if the pen doesn't work. More difficult is the question whether I am
subject to jurisdiction in Melbourne if I don't pay for it. We will just
have to wait and see. That's an active, transactional Web site.
In the middle, said this prescient Judge, you have interactive
Web sites. You can communicate back and forth, but you really
can't consummate transactions. You can't engage in business. And
he thought that, in the immortal two words of the law that really
sums up your three years at this law school and probably the next
sixty years thereafter in the profession because it's all you have to
know about the law: "it depends." With regard to the interactive
Web site, it depends. It depends on a variety of factors,
commonsensical factors-the frequency and intensity of the
interaction, the proximity to actually engaging in a transaction or
some formal business, and how profitable or how much of an assist
toward profitability the Web site is. Thus, the District Court
established this sliding-scale framework and numerous cases have
embraced it.
Now, how do you fit that framework into what you've studied in
the Procedure course? Well, you know that the Supreme Court of
the United States has announced that we have general jurisdiction
and specific jurisdiction." General jurisdiction is a form of
continuous and systematic contact between the defendant and the
forum. It's unlikely that a Web site in and of itself would give rise
to general jurisdiction, although eBay might be an example of a Web
site that is continuously and systematically in every state of the
Union-and beyond. But certainly, a Web site-plus-a Web site
plus other activities by the defendant in the forum-might give you
general jurisdiction.
There really aren't very many general jurisdiction Web site cases
yet, so we look to specific jurisdiction. That generally requires us to
look at long-arm jurisdiction. If you've studied the Georgia Long-
" Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
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Arm Statute,1 2 it is very much out of central casting. It is very much
like any other explicit long-arm statute. It deals with transacting
business, torts in the state, torts out of the state having an impact
in the state, and all the rest. And then, it seems to me, it becomes
a more or less straight application of traditional principles of long-
arm jurisdiction. This statutory analysis is backed up by that
massive jurisprudence that consumes so much of a first-year
Procedure course under the Due Process Clause, starting with
International Shoe Corp. v. State of Washington' 3-- minimum
contacts equaling fair play and substantial justice. Does the Web
site have minimum contacts with the forum so that it's fair play and
substantial justice to reach out and touch it and grab it and subject
it to local jurisdiction? Again, that is a question of whether the
defendant's contact with the forum are a little bit more, or a little
bit less than the Constitution demands.
What I have just described is very reminiscent of Calder v. Jones.
Indeed, the Fourth Circuit in a case decided months ago 4 said:
"You know, this is like Calder v. Jones."" In Calder v. Jones, what
did you have? You had this miserable gossip newspaper magazine
down in Florida writing nasty, but fun stuff about celebrities. The
object of the particular story happened to be in California but the
defendant had directed the publication into California. And the
Court said, "Look, look, you purposefully availed yourself of
California, you directed yourself at California, and you caused
impact in California. Constitutionally, that's enough." And it seems
to me, many, many Web sites, particularly transactional Web sites,
Web sites that are directed at a particular subpopulation that can
be identified or geographically located, would qualify in
constitutional terms, so that if the particular events and litigation
fit the words of the long-arm statute and fit the Supreme Court tests
from Shoe to Calder, there should be jurisdiction.
The great mystery is whether the principles we have been
discussing qualify under the "stream of commerce" doctrine, which
12 O.C.G.A. §§ 9-10-90 to 9-10-94 (1981 & Supp. 2003).
S 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See generally 4A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, §§ 1067-
1609.8.
' ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002).
465 U.S. 783 (1984).
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extends jurisdiction over anyone who puts a product (and
presumably a service) into the "stream of commerce" anywhere the
product (or service) is sent and allegedly causes injury. Of course,
the Supreme Court left us dangling in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court6 as to whether entry into the "stream of commerce"
in and of itself was constitutionally sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction. Four Justices said yes; four Justices said you needed
more; and one Justice thought it unnecessary to decide the issue.
We have been waiting for more than fifteen years for further
enlightenment on the subject.
Can you think of anything that fits the concept of "stream of
commerce" more clearly than a Web site? A Web site puts that
information, that data, that business information into the stream of
commerce, and the ultimate question (not decided by the Supreme
Court) is does that create what might approximate universal
jurisdiction? To wax poetic: "I shot my electronic signals into the
air, they fell to earth, I know not where. But there is jurisdiction."
At least four justices in Asahi said that's the way it should be. But
none of those justices are still on the Court.
Okay, that's illustration number one of our exploration of the
brave new world of Internet law. Let me give you another one that's
a personal favorite of mine. In introducing me, Ron mentioned that
I have a secondary interest in copyright. It's actually my primary
interest, although the bulk of my professional activities are devoted
to Procedure. I love copyright. I love copyright. I originally decided
to teach it because I loved books and movies, and art and plays.
Until recently it was a boutique law school subject. Fifty, sixty
students saying let's take that weird old Miller for a course. But it's
no longer only about books and movies, and art and plays. It's
increasingly about technology. Indeed, for most law students it's
largely about technology. And, I can't beat them away with a stick.
Copyright and Intellectual Property are "in" courses.
There are certain things we know. We know that computer
programs are copyrightable as "literary works." They are works of
18 480 U.S. 102 (1987). See generally 4A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 1067.4.
17 See generally Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protetn for Computer Programs, Databases, and
Computer Generated Work& Is Anything New Since CONTU., 106 HARv. L REv. 977,983-84(1993).
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expression, human expression. We know that databases are
copyrightable, although the Supreme Court has ratcheted back on
what the copyrightable element of a database is.18 It's not facts, and
it's not completeness. It's selection. It's arrangement. In other
words, there's a copyright in a database, whether it is Dow Jones,
a Mobil Travel Guide, or Westlaw or Lexis, but it is a rather thin
copyright. So we know those things. We know that copyright will
probably extend to computer-produced art and music. What my
friends at MIT are struggling with is the copyright status of works
generated by artificial intelligence. But, thank goodness those great
scientists are only at the flatworm stage, so we've got a way to go
before we really have to worry about that subject.
All right, so what's the Internet issue? The issue is the obvious
question that everybody in this room has read about. Can I go to
the Internet and just copy? Can I just copy anything on the
Internet? Now you know one version of that question as the so-
called Napster problem-the music problem. 9 That is just one
manifestation of it. You go to the Internet, and you start reaching
into various sources of information pockets, and the question
is-can you take something from that information pocket, or will
somebody slap your wrist and say, "You're an infringer"? Now if you
talk to lots of folks in the "biz," in the Internet "biz," you discover it's
populated, rampantly so, by folks like those who believe in free
software. They think the Internet is a free zone, a public commons.
They believe that anything on the Internet is free and can be
downloaded, reproduced, and retransmitted. They think that you
can copy it, you can replicate it, and you can distribute it. If I know
anything about copyright, I have to say that can't be true. It just
can't be true-at least not in those extreme terms. If I write a book,
and then put it on television or the motion pictures or radio or video,
each and every one of those transformations is a copyrightable
'8 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service, 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (holding
only original selection and arrangement of database are protectable).
'9 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., Nos. C9905183MHP, C000074MHP, 2000 WL
1170106 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000), affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds 239
F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 2001). Variations on the Napster model also have ended up in litigation.
See generally In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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derivative work of my copyrighted book, and he or she who takes it
is a copyright infringer! Pure and simple, that merely reflects good
old American property values. I cannot conceive of the answer being
any different just because somebody reaches into the Internet rather
than the public library to copy my work. If it's copyrighted, it's
copyrighted, although courts seem to be increasingly sensitive to a
variety of competing policies many of which are embedded in the
Fair Use doctrine.20
And that, of course, is exactly what happened in the Napster
case, and I cannot see any result other than that. Now, Napster
may be more or less a thing of the past, although there is a thing
called-I can't even pronounce it-KaZaa... Accent on the wrong
syllable, right? Kazaa. What is Kazaa? Kazaa is the offspring of
Napster. You can go to Kazaa and you can get music. It's already
got millions of subscribers. It's already been sued. And already
guess what you could get on Kazaa as of a couple of days ago? The
Harry Potter movie. You can get Harry Potter on Kazaa-in some
places before it reaches the movie houses. Understandably, Warner
Brothers was extremely upset. As well it should be. Also
understandably there are those that say, let's go get and stamp out
Kazaa, just the way we terminated Napster in its original iteration;
let's do it, as they say in the movies, with extreme prejudice.
Here's the problem. Kazaa is a product of an enterprise called
Sharman Networks. Catch this. I love it. This is right out of a first
year law school examination question. The distributor of the
program is incorporated in the South Pacific island nation of
Vanuatu. Now we've all visited there, haven't we?! We speak of
nothing else but Vanuatu, right?! The service is managed from
Australia. Its computer servers are in Denmark. And the source
code for its software was last seen in Estonia. The original
developers appear to be living in the Netherlands. But no one
appears to be very sure. Now, where do we sue, as the law school
exam would ask? Whose law applies? And since there are
practicing lawyers in the room, the ultimate question is-how do
20 Fair Use has been codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2004). See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft
Corp., 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002).
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you enforce the judgment in Vanuatu? I don't think our
Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause applies there.
So there are enormous difficulties in enforcing copyrights, even
if we all agree that the copyrightable status does not change simply
because a work of expression is on the Internet. There are
enormous problems of identification and enforcement. These are not
insurmountable problems. I remind everyone, being an old fogey,
that the world of music used to be sheet music. The copyright
proprietor, Stephen Foster, for example, made his money by selling
copies of sheet music and perhaps by performing his songs. Well,
the whole world's lost its music literacy. Nobody buys and reads
sheet music anymore. They simply play the music on some type of
electronic device.
And, in the 1910s and 20s, how did music copyright proprietors
enforce their copyrights? Because people were performing, without
licenses or permission, which is an illicit act-just as copying is an
illicit act-they formed ASCAP (American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers) and then BMI (Broadcast Music
Industries). They hired an army of private detectives who fanned
out into the nightclubs and the hotels and the dining establishments
of America. They would sit there and as soon as they heard
copyrighted music, they would pull a summons out of their pocket
and say, "Which would you prefer, a license or this?" Eventually,
they got the entire performing industry-including establishments
that played live, recorded, or broadcasted music-to honor the
copyrights.2 '
I think we will see consortia of other groups of copyright
proprietors develop to deal with the Internet. We will see
technological enforcement in the sense that the same technology
that can carry information can also monitor how it is used and bill
for it. That's a matter of time. And indeed, to offer a prediction (I'm
violating my own rule), it seems to me, that the concept of copyright
infringement-which historically, meant copy an entire work,
although we don't do that much anymore; we extract, we sample, we
seek answers, we perform-will probably transmute itself into a
basic notion of use, and it will be use that will be the compensable
1 See generally Buck v. Jewel LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
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act. The Internet community and the relevant industries over time
are going to figure out how. It's just a question of debits and credits
for copyright proprietors and users.
Let me make a few comments about a third and final subject.
Again, it's one near and dear to my heart-it's privacy. Issues of
privacy and technology have also been kicking around for a long
time. It goes back to wiretapping in the criminal law field. In the
1960s, that concern about privacy developed into the Big Brother
imagery of Orwell's 1984 that surrounded the government's proposal
to create a computer based National Data Center-that's when I got
involved in it both as an author and as an activist.22 It was then
that people began to realize that our privacy was being invaded, not
by spike microphones driven into walls and parabolic microphones
aimed at people, but simply by data collection, or data extraction
and data dissemination. Indeed, those of you who can remember the
Vietnam conflict (a supposed non-war) may recall that a military
operation called CONUS (Continental United States) Intelligence
developed a database of dossiers on all people protesting the
Vietnam War. I remember when I was at the University of
Michigan teaching on the law faculty. The university behaved
rather stupidly by complying with a House Un-American Activities
Committee subpoena for information on a number of university
students without telling the university students and complying two
weeks in advance. I mean, academics often lack common sense, but
that's off the charts. They did it, so predictably the students seized
the Administration building. A couple of my colleagues, Sam Estep
and Layman Allen and I, went out to this massive sit-in, just to
explain to the kids-I shouldn't say that because I was a kid
then-what all this was about. And the next thing I know, there is
a file on me in Congress. I'm exercising First Amendment rights
and educational freedoms, and the government has created a dossier
on me. [As these remarks are being prepared for publication, we
learn that a dossier was also created on John Kerry, now Senator
from Massachusetts and the presumptive Democratic nominee for
President, because of his activities against the War in Vietnam.] In
" See, e.g., ARTHU R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS,DATABANKS,AND
DossIERs (1971).
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any event, it was not a happy chapter in our Nation's life. And
many people and Congress started to think about technology and
privacy.
Well, let's fast-forward and look at the Internet. Consider how
much of your life is captured in a data bank and available on the
Internet. We are in an era of healthcare accountability, a keystone
of which is the conversion of all medical data into electronic form
and the ability to transmit it back and forth to medical providers,
insurers, bean counters, and who knows who else. So, our entire
health profile ends up on the Internet. On the bright side, of course,
it should make for more economical and efficient delivery of health
services. Virtually everything we do is recorded. Whether you fly
on an airplane, use a credit card, check into a hotel, you're at least
generating an electronic file, and all of that, over time, goes into the
Net. My friends from Atlanta put me into the Ritz Carlton
yesterday before we all came to Athens this morning. First thing
said by the clerk was, "Welcome back, Mr. Miller." I'd been there six
years ago, but the hotel's computer said I was a repeat customer.
Now, if that got me an extra chocolate or a free beverage, perhaps
I would be willing to trade my privacy. But, what the anecdote
illustrates is the increasing commercial utilization of personal
information; it's just a piece of imagery of what is happening in our
world of sophisticated direct marketing. What do we do about
protecting individual privacy? In an environment in which, as I said
near the beginning of these remarks, any piece of information about
any one of us can move globally in two seconds, what do we do about
the international implications of vast data-banking and information
transfer? What do we do about the transnational character of
information systems and the ability to put personal information on
the Net and move without our knowing it or having any ability to
control it?
Now, against that reality, let's look at the Patriot Act of 2001. 2-
This is a statute that I defy anyone in this room to read from
beginning to end and stay awake. It is a stunning statute. It
' Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Public Law No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 [hereinafter Patriot Act].
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provides for what are called "sneak and peak" searches and seizures,
not based on probable cause but based on a lower standard of reason
to believe. 2' "Sneak and peak" searches and seizures. It provides
for data intelligence in terms of international terrorists and spying,
which can be done in conjunction with criminal investigations so you
don't know which is the tail and which is the dog.2 But most
germanely for purposes of this afternoon's talk, it literally provides,
based on FBI declaration, the right to data mine... to access, study,
and make decisions regarding any data on any part of your life that
is in electronic form-and since that process can follow you through
your daily activities it means the government can data mine anyone
you are in communication with on a global basis.2" I say that
because another provision in the Patriot Act of 2001 provides for
data exchange between the United States and friendly
governments,27 which I suppose means everyone other than Iraq,
Iran, Syria, and maybe North Korea these days. The legislation is
really quite stunning. And it makes me think that today, in the
year 2002, understanding the horror of 9/11 and the need for the
war against terrorism, that here in 2002, under the Patriot Act of
2001, we are right back where we were during the Vietnam War.'
Of course, the civil liberties community is up in arms so there will
be constitutional challenges, and those will be enjoyable to watch
and even more enjoyable to participate in if the opportunity arises.
So, there you have just a trilogy of illustrative aspects of
cyberspace and the law. It will fill your professional lives with
wondrous issues, whether you are a transactional lawyer and are
called upon to anticipate many of the implications of cyberspace to
protect your client, or whether you're a litigator, and that means
whether you are a plaintiff's litigator or a defendant's litigator. All
you have to do is look at a couple of recent cases that are not far
from sounding like a law school exam. DoubleClick, the people who
24 Patriot Act § 213.
2 Id. § 215.
2 Id. § 218.
27 Id. § 215.
" For a contrary view of the privacy implications of the Patriot Act, see Orin S. Kerr,
Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother that Isn't, 97 Nw. U.
L. REV. 607 (2003).
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put up the advertising flags that miraculously-and without
invitation-appear when you go into a Web site. They've been sued
several times because they put those flags up pursuant to a
contractual arrangement either with a Web site or with an ISP.
Now, this is not fictional. Suppose you are looking for a book for
Christmas, so you go to Amazon.com. Amazon.com will at the first
sign of your appearance slip you a "cookie." That "cookie" has been
placed in your machine because Amazon wants to do what the Ritz
Carlton did to me last night. They want a kinder, friendlier
relationship with you. That's marketing, that's modern direct
marketing. Okay, remember this is a hypothetical but apparently
this is what is happening. They didn't get my consent to do it.
Although many organizations now have a privacy statement if you
can find it on their Web site and if you can understand the language
that says, "[by] coming on the Web sites, you consent to their
'cookie-ing' you" like, "You come here, you give up your privacy."
It's like those shrink-wrap licenses around software or "Click
Here" or "I Accept" boxes you see on many Web sites. In any event,
they put their "cookie" in, and then up comes the advertising flag,
courtesy of DoubleClick, who also puts a "cookie" into your machine,
because now they want to track you to see what other sites-they're
not only interested in Amazon.com-they want to know where you
go around the Net, what you're reading and what you're thinking
about buying, so they will have a better target for selecting which of
their flags should be put on your screen. They can now customize
their flags to meet your habits. That's actually in litigation.'
Indeed, in the spirit of full disclosure, I served as counsel in one
such case.
Another case in which I personally participated at the class
action certification stage, involved CVS, the premier pharmacy
chain in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. A number of drug
manufacturers had convinced CVS to turn over pharmacy
information to them so that the drug manufacturers could
29 See, e.g.,In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497,500 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(challenging-unsuccessfully-DoubleCick's practices of gathering information about
Internet users who view DoublicClick products or services and placing "cookies" on Internet
users' computers).
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communicate with the drug purchasers about alternative
therapies.3 0 Think about that. There are First Amendment values
that are in play, medical information that the recipient might want
to know-but at the same time it involves a privacy invasion.
There's no consent, and there's a breach of a privilege that exists in
Massachusetts between pharmacy and patient. So, the litigation
about privacy and the Internet has already started. Those of you
who are students better hurry up and graduate because who knows,
these interesting cases may all be gone by the time you leave this
marvelous institution and enter the profession.
But I jest. In truth, I suspect the legal implications of the
Internet-and I've only touched the tip of the iceberg-will outlast
all of us in this room. It may prove to be the most important
twenty-first century technological phenomenon. Given the
Internet's global character, many of these issues can only be dealt
with on an international basis, and who knows how we will ever
achieve that. On the other hand, if we were able to get a 15-0 vote
in the Security Council on the first Gulf War, miracles do happen.
Going even further, perhaps one day Internet problems having
transnational characteristics will wend their way to an
international tribunal. So, let me close by wishing you great good
fortune in your careers. And, I hope you do encounter some of these
problems, because they are intellectually wondrous and should
make you feel professionally alive and challenge you to use all of
your skills. Thank you.
's See Weld v. Glaxo WeUcome, Inc., 746 N.E.2d 522 (Mass. 2001).
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